THE idea of evolution in time has been the main influence in biology for many decades; and in philosophy the universe is a four-dimensional continuum of which time is an essential aspect. In narrower fields it is the same. That disease is a matter of time relations was the opinion of Clifford Allbutt. Hughlings Jackson and von Monakow have insisted on the importance of a time-factor in all the normal and pathological changes of the nervous system; while investigations such as those of the physiologists into chronaxy are another recognition of its significance. It would be strange if psychology and psychopathology, always responsive to current modes of thought, should here be lacking. Nor are they, but one can still comfortably read through all the available literature, written by a handful of German and French psychiatrists, on time-phenomena in mental disorder. There are two aspects of this subject. The first is the time factor as a determinant of the duration of illness: a factor too often ignored by psychotherapists of the thaumaturgic kind-this I do not propose to consider. The second is of time as a modality of personal experience, an immediate or derivative datum of consciousness. Gross disorders of this occur in organic psychoses, where disorientation in time is a familiar feature, but it is also found in the "functional" psychoses, and it is with the latter that I am here concerned.
An extract from the case record of one of my patients will illustrate the matter.
" Everything seems very much longer. I should have said it was afternoon, though they say it is midday. They always tell me it is earlier than I think .... . . and it looks as if I'm wrong and I can't help feeling I'rh right ..... . I cannot see any end to anything, any end to the world ..... . I don't know whether I shall die quickly within what we call time and then have no more feeling ..... . Time has a limit, but I don't know what limit . . . . . . Time certainly passes, there is progression but not in the ordinary way now; there seem to be long pauses and then it goes on in the ordinary way .y... .
I've felt
twice that time is standing still . . . . . . I suppose I judge my time by the way I feel where the sun is; I noticed it very suddenly changes as though at the will of someone ....
. I think no one will ever die." This is fairly typical of one kind of time disorder: and one hears such accounts not only from the highly educated or philosophically minded but also from unintelligent, illiterate or matter-of-fact patients. In such a patient as the above there are unquestionable changes in the sense of time. To examine these one must have some notion of the psychology of time, i.e., of the mental happenings which permit us to recognize the present, judge the duration and passage of time, and bring it into relation with other contents of consciousness.
Time is a word of several meanings. There is objective physical time, clock time, calendar time, and there is personal time, experiential time, in short, psychological time. The former, which may be called world time, is the arbitrary standard, a fictional construction. The latter is time that we live in. They are usually more or less in agreement, more especially where no disturbing factors enter, as in sleep, MAR.-PSYCH. I hypnosis, and in certain waking states. But psychologically they are quite separate. Time-consciousness is a matter of immediate experience: it is an aspect of all conscious activity: it is essential to all reality: whatever we call it, durwee vclte or what not, it is inescapable in every reality-experience: we live in time. J. S.
Haldane puts it summarily: " When we perceive things they are perceived as related to a past and future, and as related spatially to one another .... . . Past, future, and contemporary present are thus given in each experience .... . . our perceptions express our interest. In other words our perceived world is no mere picture independent of our presence in it, but the embodiment of our personal interest which reaches back over the past and forward to the future, so that past and future are represented in the present. Each of our perceptions, and each of our actions, embodies learning from experience, and therefore both retrospect and foresight; .. .....; when we see evidence of this we interpret the behaviour as being conscious. Unity extending over events in time as well as space is expressed in conscious behaviour." Time is by no means an attribute of sensation, though probably of perception.
Those who consider time from a genetic point of view hold that the elementary primitive phenomenon was duration: this, in its dependent relation to conduct, was developed into the idea of stability which was extended and objectivated so as to become a feature of the environment, otherwise so changeable and manifold. Beginning and ending are indispensable integral parts of duration; rhythm, so important in biology and art, is a mixture of stability and change. The conception of the present is a later development; with it comes the conception of the absent, to which we adapt ourselves by expectation. Memory has developed in order to integrate past experience with the living present. The present is set apart as a particular point, " now," in relation to which the succession of happenihgs can be put in order as past and future. Otherwise one has pure and simple succession, as in children who mix up the order of events. Thus the present has a constant relation to action and striving. This setting up of a notion of the present is possibly a complex, not a primitive, mental process; through it meaning is given to the present.
In d4jd vit there is a brief inability to actualize the present which in consequence is projected into the past. The l)resent and the past are not uniform: there is an immediate past, a recent, a remote, and an indefinite past (and future), graded according to their closeness to the present and intimacy with it, as it were, and according to their explicit emotional character. The immediate past is not a matter of recollection: it is a progressive reality, almost continuous with the present, but shading off into the mnore remote, the mass of forgotten but available l)ast from which can be evoked clearer recollections by bringing them up into the iminediate past. Our conception of the past is like our consciousness in general: the totality of both consists in a global feeling of which only certain modalities attain to clear presentation.
With the penetration of the notion of tiIne by the idea of reality the essential features of the process are arrived at. Instead of giving the same reality to past, present and future, the present is now regarded as real, past and future as unreal: diminishing degrees of reality attach to the immediate, near and remote past, as to the immediate near and remote future, but the indefinite past and future are almost entirely unreal, and such remoteness as is implicit in eternity is for us ordinarily an abstract fiction.
As a form of philosophical organization of time, the general and universal idea of time has developed, like the corresponding idea of space something independent of ourselves; something external, unitary and abstract; a time which passes and destroys. A scientific mode of organization of time has led to the introduction of objective measures as well as to a determinist conception of time, as the conservative, yet always dynamic, transmitter of past forms of energy into forms yet to come.
The objective measures of time are familiar divisions of " world time," in which the present is a travelling point-not a brief brightest area in a scale of brightness shading off as it recedes at either end: in it the past disappears. Personal time is often brought into'relation with world time. We have a consciousness that time is passing quickly or slowly in an absolute sense: also we may conclude that it is passing quickly or slowly in relation to world time; the two are commonly associated but by no means identical. In boredom, for example, time is said to pass slowly, because it is not possible to give it the content one would choose; hence, secondarily, comes distressing attention to the passage of time. Interesting changing occupation gives one the time consciousness " how fast it goes," though after it one has the impression of a long day, full of incident: a dull tiresome day seems, to retrospection, short. But this time consciousness is different from "time sense," which enables us to guess at the duration of an interval in terms of world time. Some would limit this as a simple perceptual process to very brief intervals (one and a half to two seconds), and regard the appreciation of longer intervals as a matter of judgment: they talk further of memory images, and of intervals with and without stimuli, but these notions and experiments and this element in the process, if it be one, need not detain us. What is the basis of this quantitative awareness of time, whether it be of long intervals or short ones ? Several explanations are current among experimental psychologists: some referring to feelings of tension, others to contents of sensation, and so on; generally they mistake the factors which hinder it or alter it for those which are its basis. Others speak of " psycho-energetic " processes which appear in consciousness as a feeling of activity; thus they connect the quantitative appreciation of time with the psychic concomitants of action. But this alone is not helpful. One must consider, I submit, two elements: (1) an immediate awareness of the magnitude of duration or of speed of succession; and (2), an ability to recall similar former experiences for comparison. I do not suggest that the latter are simple memory images or engrams, plucked out of their pigeon-holes for the purpose, as schematizers would have it, but as representing particular aspects of memory, to which I have already alluded. As to the former, it is carried out best in sleep and allied states; in waking hours the less of affective interest and direct attention to it, the better it is performed. The psycho-analysts say it is a function of the pre-conscious part of the psyche. It is, I would suggest, a particular mnanifestation of the general time sense of the integrated organism, also manifested in such periodic activities as cardiac and respiratory function, sexual activities, e.g., menstruation, the alternation of metabolic changes associated with sleep and waking. Various writers pick out particular activities of this kind and hold them responsible for the special capacity: it is better to consider it as deeply rooted in biological changes of the whole organism. I would refer, in passing, to the work of Pawlow's school in regard to the conditioned time-reflex. It is not appropriate to discuss the relation of rhythm to time in further detail here: one psycho-analyst of repute thinks that time feeling is unconscious and depends on uinconscious rhythm being an endopsychic perception of fluctuation of libidodistribution.
Only with some general notions, such as the above summary of views on the psychology of time, can one set about an analysis of the disorders of time processes that we meet in our patients.
What are these disorders ? First let us consider depersonalization and the sense of unreality. The following is a description of his time disorder by a young man with a striking clinical picture of this sort: me-the spirit: I have no life.
. . I'm dead already. I can't die. The mind is alive. You can't kill that. You could hurt the physical body, but if you were to shoot me, I would drop to the ground. But 'I' would still be sitting here, it must go on and on . it's a trance, a dreadful dream. My mind is there for eternity, nothing can alter it. You can't imagine yourself different from the present, can you ? Well, I'm that, accentuated a hundredfold."
Here is another, also from a young man:-"Everything seems just a painted picture, deathly quiet. . . . I want to get something back to my mind that seems to have gone, to let me see the present and the future .... everything seems ages ago. Even getting up in the morning, I feel I've forgotten it; it seems ages ago. And yet time seems to go faster. If anybody had asked me at this time (12.30 p.m.) I'd have thought it was only half an hour since I got up. It simply means that time is going quicker than I realized. These are not rarities or exceptions. They are typical of numerous accounts that I have collected. They illustrate many of the outstanding features of the disorder: the inability to evoke the past readily or clearly, to distinguish the present from the past and the future (" I think about them all three at once, past, present and future," said another patient), to seize the present, to look into the future or to anticipate a future for oneself; there is paradoxically the increased quickness with which time passes, though it seems also to drag along; the seeming remoteness of the recent past; theunconfirmed feeling of inability to judge length of time;
The point-by-point application to these phenomena of the considerations presented earlier in this paper is, no doubt, sufficiently apparent. I will, however, put forward some more general considerations. The influence of MacCurdy, or an itch for causality-explanations in terms of comprehensible einfiihlbare psychic processes, has led to this syndrome being regarded as a sequel or "manifestation of loss of interest which is in turn related to the loss of energy and stimulus susceptibility." Ihave elsewhere put forward evidence against this view. I would regard the syndrome as indicative of the disturbed state of consciousness in which the immediate data of perception-an active, not a passive process-are so changed as tohave lost their primary attribute of reality. There is a change in space-and time-consciousness which may be expressed in various forms: simply, as in the above instances, or less clearly in general feelings of a change in the environment, or of complex rearrangements of space and time relations. In short, clinically one finds the syndrome of unreality and depersonalization, in various guises but none the less unmistakable, in many kinds of mental disorderin manic and depressive states, in schizophrenia, in obsessive-ruminative tension states, encephalitis lethargica, toxic confusional and delirious forms, epilepsy and hysterical dissociations. That is easily demonstrable clinically; without going into all its implications I suggest that in all mental disorder there may be more or less disturbance of consciousness in this sense, and that this disorder of consciousness, in affective as well as other forms of mental disorder, may manifest itself only in a trifling time and reality disorder, hardly distinguishable from the variations we are aware of in ourselves (who are presumably normal) up through a growing obviousness to the grossest forms of disorientation and distortion.
I have not referred to the disturbance of space appreciation in this syndrome, but it is of the same order. The clearest analogue to depersonalization and unreality in ourselves, if indeed it is not the same thing, is the djd vu or d6jd racontd phenomenon. I think immediate premonitions also must be included here; in this connection I would recall what was said about expectation in the earlier part of the paper. I have been impressed in reading a large number of records of the unreality syndrome to find how regularly it is associated with a feeling of imminent disaster. I cannot here consider its relation to anxiety, but I mention it, and refer also to the statement which patients make that " there is no future ": this invariably refers only to the personal future, sometimes only to a pleasant or tolerable future: "I feel nothing will change in so far as I shall never be better," said one patient; " I feel as if there's no future," said another, yet at the same interview he said, " I dread everything; I picture all sorts of terrible things, that I shall go to asylums, and all sorts of things." There are variations in the manner of description: there is sometimes conscious elaboration, but in the main, the uniformity in essentials is amazing. One variation is in the attitude towards recollections. Some insist on the remoteness and vagueness of the past, others on its sharpness and clarity in comparison with the present; they say they have lively pictures coming up:
" Everything seemed suddenly to go backwards. The future seemed to go and the memory came forward. My memory became vivid, my childhood became vivid. It seemed to come automatically. I came to form mental pictures. From that I went back and back. It seemed as though everything was changing. The present and the future didn't worry me. Vivid pictures kept coming." This variation is commoner in depressives, in whom the deterministic force of the past is strongly felt : things are occurring now, will occur in the future, which are only continuing evidences of past happenings; the future is closed to new action but an irrevocable process has been set in train. (In schizophrenics it is sometimes stated in the form, "I feel that what I say now will influence the future.") This brings us to the depressives. Here emphasis must be laid on the inhibition or " retardation." This inhibition, which von Monakow calls "apathetic anastole," is a total change, affecting experience and determining conduct. I would bring into relation the altered time-consciousness which exists alongside unimpaired timejudgment (or time-perception, sensut strictiori), and altered activity-feelings which exist alongside unimpaired psychomotor capacity. "Retardation" is a personal experience, not an objectively demonstrable slowing or diminution of psychic or psychomotor performance; for this there is clinical and experimental evidence. In the case of the time-disorder, I have carried out on depressives a number of experiments in time-appreciation, using mainly the same tests as Bouchard set forth in his monograph, and I have found, as others have, ever since Revault d'Allonnes' work on the Korsakow syndrome in 1903, that the patients' professed incapacity to estimate duration is not borne out by objective tests for short intervals, and scarcely at all for longer intervals, though here other factors come in. I think that this inconsistency in both psychomotor and temporal experience can be referred to a common factor, which I should also hold responsible, in part, for that obstinate and ominous symptom-a belief that one has spent a sleepless night when it is not so: the distinction between this symptom and true sleeplessness is important and too often overlooked. In these depressive patients the rapidity with which time passes is felt, as well as its painful heaviness: the sufferer is beset with a press of memories, vivid and insistent.
The following is the account of his time disorder given by a recurrent depressive, self-reproachful and anergic, seen in his fourth attack : " I'm an absolute blank; I can't imagine what it is like outside. It seems as though the end is corning to me, dreadful. I can't imagine to-morrow. The days seem to fly by like magic, but I can't look forward, I look backward all the time, all my childhood. I feel I can't do anything correctly, somehow." Another, a young girl, said: " I can't think of the past and the future; it all seems a blank. Thoughts and memories will keep going round and round in my head: they are all of things I have seen and done during the last few years. They are like little pictures inside my head. " Only in so far as experiences acquire full meaning and reality, can they be incorporated into one's individual life history, and contribute to the development and unfolding of one's personality. It is inevitable that with the closing off of the individual future, i.e., anticipated activity, the past shall become torturing and intolerable: in a certain measure also the present. This is important in connection with compulsive states, to which I now come.
The intimate relation between compulsive and manic-depressive types of reaction is generally acknowledged, and is clinically and psychopathologically so manifest that it is unnecessary to consider the older view that one was a "psychosis" and the other a " neurosis," and that they were essentially different. The real problem is in many cases how to account for the development in, say, one depressive patient of delusions and in another of compulsions-compulsive thinking and compulsive acts.
Compulsive phenomena, considered not so much according to their content (which is symbolic), but according to their form, commonly show time components. This observation was made so long ago as 1874 in a paper in the Journal of Mental Science. As far as content is concerned, compulsive doubts and questions are sometimes taken up with time, especially in patients preoccupied with creation and causality, primeval chaos and suchlike metaphysical expense of spirit in a waste of thought. One patient, for example, with gross obsessional symptoms, said:-"I keep worrying about the origin of God. I think about eternity. There is one thing that worries me: I can't get it off my mind. These eternal years trouble me a bit. My imagination is set going, and gets on numbers and eternal numbers, and eternity. Immensity, too. . . ." Another patient with obsessional attacks of the cyclic variety said:-"I have to reason everything out. I seem right up against a blank wall, and I feel I can't go on existing like that. . . . Do you think if I read some books about it would I get some rest? I have to just think and think about things like that. I can't get any satisfaction. I keep worrying about thousands of years ago, about the beginning of things. I feel I must know. If I don't know everything like that I don't want to go on. . I can't understand about the chaos that there was in the beginning and what was before that." Time and eternity, the beginning of things and their end, are here the content of the compulsive phenomena; but what of their form ? The main characteristic of this so far as compulsive thinking is concerned-and it applies equally to compulsive ideas and impulses-were referred to also in the foregoing examples: the inability to stop, to get satisfaction, the feeling of incompleteness, of lack of finality. One patient who said of her thinking " I feel as if I'm all mind, as if I'iax mind altogether, and I don't get anywhere with my thinking," said also: "Sometimes when I am writing something I can't get past a full-stop. I keep making it bigger and bigger."
Many examples support the familiar view that it is in the incapacity to complete the particular act and so dispose of it, that the essence of morbid " compulsion " lies. Many psychologists now regard thinking also as an act, as internal conduct. Be this as it may, thinking and conduct are both carried out in constant reference to the future which is the arena in which the personality expresses or unfolds itself; but this time-attitude is altered where general inhibition has occurrecl. For the normal person; the past and the present are carried on into the future satisfactorily only when completed and dealt with; the less this is so the more there is of regret and return to the past: there is difficulty in completing an act, i.e., there is indecision, where the particular act will gravely affect thel future. But in the inhibited obsessional patient it is not concern about effects in the future that hinders action; for him the future is barred, and so in his acts he is continually struggling against this check, hindered in completion and disposal, and thrust back to his starting point. Both the inhibited depressed patient and the inhibited obsessional do no effectual acts, but in the one it is by refraining from action at all, and in the other by indeterminateness and vain repetition of acts. I am sensible of certain difficulties in this and of its limited application; and I emphasize that one is here concerned with the form, not the content of the compulsions.
Compulsive phenomena of various kinds are prominent in encephalitics. In them, too, one finds disturbances in time-appreciation; thus a patient with oculogyric crises said:-" My eyes turn up and I get sentences like 'What is what?' going through my mind. Time seems to go quickly. And yet it seems to drag. When I look at the clock the time has passed more quickly than I thought .It was one o'clock when I started reading and I'd read two pages by three o'clock and I expected it to be about half-past one. During these attacks I feel I can't see how I can come right. While I'm in it I seem to be thinking of the past the whole time, but these thoughts like 'What is what? 'come in between ..... During the attacks I feel older: I feel as if I've had a lot of experience." Another said: " Time seems to hang a bit but especially when it (the oculogyric attack) is coming on. I feel terrible, right down ill. You know it'll stop, but sometimes you feel it'll go on for ever. In the old attacks (more severe) used to feel you'd never get to the end of it." I am omitting the toxic-organic disorders, in which there are much grosser disturbances of consciousness, especially evident in regard to orientation in space-and time, where there is often not merely a change in time consciousness and time appreciation but also an ignorance of world time which rests on complicated disorders of judgment and memory. I am also omitting the drug-made time-disorders.
The large group of presenile or presbyo-phrenic' patients presents some of the most striking of time-disorders. I do not regard them as a unitary or distinctive group but as showing combinations of the various reaction types. There are no features of this disorder (" involutional melancholia ") beyond its greater frequency at this time of life-the climacteric and after-which may not be found in other age periods. There is nothing absolutely distinctive in the time-disorder; nothing which may not be found in younger people with similar nihilistic ideas, paranoid attitude and somatic hallucinations or delusions. I therefore quote without comment passages from a full account of striking time-disorder by a patient with " involutional melancholia ":- There is little need for comment on that typical account. In some the clhange is interpreted, not in the personal sense, but, like the unreality, it is projected and the patient declares that she must die but that no one else will ever die.
There were schizophrenic elements in that patient's account of his experienee.
In some "involutional" patients they are obtrusive. What then are the disorders of time found in the schizophrenic ? In addition to the usual unreality-accompaniments there are some distinctive features. One of these is the feeling of previous death and rebirth, as in this patient, a young woman:--" I should say it was the beginning of a new world. I think I shall die at a certain time and live again. It seems as if I have died, not recently. I used to ponder over it, and think I'd been living a long time ... . . . I think there has been a break inmy life... . . . I feel things may slow up a little more; more evenly, that's all .I think the world stops and goes on so quickly that it's only noticed by certain people . . .... In here the time goes much more evenly than anywhere else I know.. . . . . Sometimes I've got up in the mi-orning and wondered if it is night-timie. It has seemiied strange. I looked out of the window and saw the sun and it certainly looked like evening and it was really morning."
The feeling of an interruption in time occurs frequently in the records; thus one patient had said that "somebody was playing with the clocks." When talked to about it he said:-"It's very bewildering. I don't seeml to know how the date's going..... It stands still for some timie and then goes on again. I'ii sure it does. Look at watch at half-past four and then look again an hour after and it's still half-past four. Guess a long interval has elapsed ... Seemls something wrong with the tinme here. It's later than it appears. Seem to sleep the night right round including the next day somiiehow....... It seemls as though a day's gone by and I'm still in bed ... . . . The elections were held on the 27th October" [actually two days before interview]. " I should imagine that was two or three weeks ago, judging by the days that have been imissed."
Another, a young man, said; Another schizophrenic patient, who has profound disorder of time-conasciousness, though his personality is so far well preserved, and who weaves ingen ious metaphysical speculations to account for these phenomena, declares that he is able to prophesy anything that may happen within the next few years; this patient cosiders that the weeks this year are only as long as three days of former years: it is all controlled by a machine in the basement of the hospital which regulates the physical universe; he has devised a new calendar to cope with the situation. In other patients, duration seems affected in the opposite sense: one said: "I can't believe there are twelve hours in a day. I live twenty-five years in one year."
The contradiction here is only apparent: the full statement would be, "I live twenty-five years of my time in one year of world time, your time." In others the fragmentation is impenetrable, e.g., "Seems as if something in the air went by, you see what's next going to happen; puts me in distress. . . What we've been talking, what we've been writing down, have to pull it up into Time, time, the clock." And once she wrote spontaneously the words "clock-time" though I had never used the expression to her. In these patients I could not demonstrate any objective time-disorder, again making use of Bouchard's tests. A few words about mania and hysteria. In mania there is the subjective experience of capacity for rapid thinking and moving which is not confirmed by objective tests, with corresponding disproportion between personal time and worldtime: "I can think faster, I do everything faster. I feel as strong as a lion. I asked just now what time it was and he said quarter past eleven. I expected it was twelve . .
. it seems more than twelve days since I came here." Another patient: "I think too quickly. Thousands and thousands of tlioughts run through my mind. People don't seem to think quickly enough for me. I've always wanted to move quickly and other people move very slowly to my idea. I'm so full of beans and vitality. Time passes terribly quickly; only thing is it seems the opposite; at night I don't get to sleep and I long for life. . . . It seems rather long and monotonous."
In mania the not infrequent disturbance of consciousness manifests itself in misidentification of the environment and setting up of secondary temporal relations:
"I know who you are; you're Mr. Williams. You took mliy teeth out ten years ago." In the speech and conduct of the patient there are frequent reminders of the playful fantasy activity of children, already referred to. With regard to hysteria; in dissociation there may be a secondary time disorder; for example, a patient with puerilism said:-"People all seem grown up and older. And m-zy AMuml, I'mii sure I know her frolm a long time ago. I look at her, but I can't make it out."
MAR.-PSYCH. 2 * As to other hysterical manifestations, I may quote a patient who said when questioned about d6jci vu4:
"Oh, yes, I've noticed that. Tell you what I do have. Horrible feeling of the bed moving. Lasts about five or ten minutes, seems ages. As soon as I close my eyes I feel I'm either drifting along or going round and round. I feel it'll go on and on, it's like a trance. It seems a long time while I'm in it."
Many hysterical patients report premonitions:-"Many times I know what people are going to say just before they say it, and if I go up to a crowd in the street I know what's happened. Yesterday I was in the street and I said to myself, 'That lorry's going to turn over.' and that very minute it ran into a 'bus in Exwell Street and fell over."
These are, of course, not infrequent experiences in normal people, but when one asks hysterics routine vague questions about time, they commonly report this experience more frequently than other people. One of the striking features in the hysteric is that, although completely idle, many of them say that time goes quickly :--Time seems to pass very quickly, to me it do. I get up of a morning and it seems no tim-e before I go to bed again," said a man with gross conversion symptoms, who lived a day as devoid of outward incident as sitting on a chair by the fire could make it. This is comprehensible if one considers that it is an inability to fill time with the contents of choice that makes for boredom, or a slow passage of time; in the hysteric these conditions do not obtain.
I have endeavourecl to give a very brief if superficial account of the main features that have emerged in an investigation of rather wide range. The whole matter seems to me one of great importance in psychopathology; and though I would not be understood to refer all morbid phenomena to a disorder of time-consciousness, I think it appears in and colours most of the manifold changes of the functional unity, which we agree to subdivide into perception, affect, and the rest of our fictions. It is a primary alteration of consciousness and may be found almost as often as it is looked for in mental disorder.
